The intervention of French military forces in Mali
and the apparent reprisals in the form of the hostage crisis at the In Amenas
gas processing plant in Algeria have brought the threat of Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to international attention. The drama of the hostage
crisis has shot the hitherto unknown group ‘Signatories in Blood’ and its
leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, variably referred to as an Islamist with ties to bin
Ladin and/or a senior al-Qaeda leader, to notoriety overnight and has prompted
Western leaders to focus on the possibility of a growing threat of Islamist
terrorism on Europe’s southern border. Such tragic events are bound to provoke
a strong reaction, yet, upon closer examination, it seems that the idea of a
threat to mainland Europe is overstated.
Even at a glance, the nature of the attack –
hostage-taking for financial gain – is not the kind we have come to associate
with al-Qaeda over the years. Rather
than reflecting the “signature” suicide attack with mass casualties, the event
fits more appropriately into the series of other hostage-takings that have
taken place in Algeria in recent years but which have not been on so grand a
scale and hence have not gained the same attention as events at In Amenas.
It is not only the events which are different: the
particular branch of al-Qaeda to which they have been ascribed, al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known as the GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) stands out
for its focus on a local agenda. Although it has allegedly claimed that it
supports Osama bin Ladin, the group, which was found to be responsible for car
bombings that took place in Algiers in 2007, as well as a number of other local
incidents, appears to be more concerned with the goal of overthrowing the
Algerian government and the institution of an Islamic state in its place than
with bin Ladin’s vision of the reestablishment of the caliphate and global
jihad against the West.
While it can be argued that the above is not
entirely out of touch with al-Qaeda’s stated aims, it is nonetheless a return
to the “near enemy” – the forces of occupation and secularisation – that have
preoccupied Islamists for almost a century. While the AQIM’s claim to be acting
in the name of “al-Qaeda central” feels very much like a convenient piece of
flag-waving, current al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri declared in 2006 that
America and France were the enemies, indicating a pragmatic approach by which
senior al-Qaeda leaders aim to flatter their local affiliates, enabling one
side to continue to maintain the impression of its global reach while the other
benefits from association with the infamous name.
The true extent of any link or co-operative
strategy, however, remains open to question.
If there is little evidence to suggest genuine
cooperation between AQIM and the senior leadership of al-Qaeda, the connection
between al-Qaeda and Belmokhtar and his Signatories in Blood is even more
tenuous. Sometimes referred to as “Marlboro man” for his cigarette-smuggling
exploits, Belmokhtar has a wide-ranging and impressive criminal career which includes
drug trafficking, diamond smuggling and the kidnapping of dozens of Westerners,
such as diplomats, aid workers and
tourists, for ransoms of up to $3 million each. Yet Belmokhtar’s success
and growing influence were to be his downfall as far as his membership of AQIM
was concerned.
While his actions at In Amenas supposedly link
Belmokhtar to al-Qaeda in the eyes of the West, he in fact made the news on
various jihadist forums for falling out with AQIM for his “fractious behavior”,
and either resigned or was formally dismissed from its ranks in late 2012. Such
splintering is far from exceptional; indeed, it exemplifies the present state
of al-Qaeda.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating
in Yemen, and the recently formed Ansar al-Sharia are a case in point: despite
their different names and agendas, the two groups are frequently referred to as
one and the same and are conceived of as somehow representing a joint
force. This bias amongst commentators
towards presenting a united al-Qaeda in various regions of the world is
conducive only to resurrecting the popular, yet deeply flawed theory that
al-Qaeda operates on a global basis as a cohesive group, with all that this
implies for the threat it poses to global security.
Today more than ever before, al-Qaeda and its local
affiliates are highly fragmented and in disagreement as to their priorities of
ideology and strategy. Indeed, the lines
of fragmentation only begin here: beyond the increasing internal debate,
al-Qaeda and its local affiliates find themselves in direct contest with other,
often more established Islamist groups with radically different worldviews and
agendas, many of which now enjoy greater popularity because they are not so
ready to spill the blood of their fellow Muslims.
Whilst the existence of groups such as The
Signatories in Blood and the dramatic, violent nature of incidents such as mass
hostage-takings and car-bombings heightens fears in the West of a resurgence of
the al-Qaeda that caused so much death and destruction on 9/11, the truth is
that most of today’s al-Qaeda franchises have a much more limited vision.
Thus,
when David Cameron announces that Britain must pursue the terrorists with an
iron resolve, he unwittingly reinforces a notion of a unified Islamist threat
that does not exist in that form in reality. It is a convenient narrative which
benefits both the propaganda machine of Islamists and the calls of those in the
West who support military action, yet the true picture of those who claim to
act in the name of al-Qaeda – both in Africa and elsewhere – is far more
nuanced, and much less of a threat to Europe, than we are commonly led to
believe.
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