Africa inherited its borders – they were not created
by those who live within them, are divided by them or who cannot easily trade
across them. The many straight lines on
the map (or even the wiggly ones that follow rivers or other features) are one
of the banes of the continent. On the
one hand they artificially lump together peoples whose histories were not the
same and who, while not naturally or primordially hostile, would have chosen
different paths to nationhood. On the other, they divide peoples across two or
even a multitude of states.
These borders were set by colonial rulers but then
sanctified at its formation by the Organization of African Unity in 1963 and
later reaffirmed by the African Union (AU).
They created multicultural, multilinguistic and multiethnic nation
states – just like the treaties after the First World War and the fall of the
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires created the artificial and doomed state of
Yugsoslavia and those in eastern and central Europe whose borders are still
bones of contention. Africa is the same.
There are over 100 continuing border disputes
between states in Africa – from the Ethiopian-Eritrean border (constantly in
danger of setting off a new conflict between uneasy neighbours) to the current
Malawi-Tanzania row over the demarcation of the lake border between them
(exacerbated, as are so many global conflicts, by the lure of oil). Borders are also blocks to economic
development, bringing with them border controls, tariffs, customs arrangements
(COMESA, ECOWAS and other regional groups notwithstanding).
Africa’s share of world trade is tiny—only 3 percent
in 2009, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
but trade between nations is miniscule, making up only 10 percent of total
trade. This stands in stark contrast to 22 percent between countries in South
America, and 50 percent between those in Asia.
Borders and pointless bureaucracy, combined with the corruption that
goes with them, inhibit inter-African trade.
Africa’s borders are even more problematic than
those in contested areas of Europe, Asia and Latin America. Whilst they are usually porous and almost
impossible for weak state institutions, small armies and poorly funded police
forces to control, they often divide peoples (especially nomadic ones like the
Tuareg) and form huge obstacles to trade. Also, corruption and the desire of
people to buy and sell goods across borders create endless opportunities for
smuggling, tax evasion and cross-border crime – not just problems in
themselves, but often providing the funding for insurgency and revolt.
Mali is a perfect example of this. From its independence in 1960 it has had to
accommodate the aspirations of peoples with different languages, cultures,
economic and social lifestyles who are geographically separated by huge
distances, but are citizens of one state. From its birth, Mali and its
neighbours had to accommodate or crush the aspirations to autonomy or statehood
of the Tuareg – split across Mali, Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and
Libya. The Tuareg lived by trade across
the Sahel region and across the Sahara to North Africa.
No one state could, even if they had wanted
to, provide an autonomous homeland within an existing state, given that the
Tuareg are widely dispersed and their aspirations not limited to the
populations within a single state. The
Tuareg repeatedly launched rebellions in Mali and Niger. These were defeated, but the spark of
resistance was never fully extinguished.
The Tuareg were used by Gadaffi in Libya as part of
his Islamic Arab Legion, which fought and was defeated in Chad in the 1980s and
was made part of Libya’s armed forces – effectively mercenaries helping keep
him in power and interfere in the affairs of neighbouring states. Libya under
Gaddafi backed rebellions by the Tuareg in the Sahel – armed them, financed
them and trained them.
When he fell, they and other non-Libyan fighters
were among the major targets for the militias who, with Western help, overthrew
and killed him. The foreign fighters
fled – many Tuareg to Niger, where most were rapidly disarmed. Others went back to Mali and kept hold of
their weapons. They linked up with Islamic groups including many Tuareg who
lived by smuggling in the unpoliced north of the country.
The Tuareg launched their rebellion seeking to
establish an independent state – ‘Azawad’ – through the MNLA movement, aided by
the Libyan weapons they had brought with them.
The rest, as they say, is history.
The MNLA had initial successes, was then dominated and marginalized by
Islamist movements and those movements are now being pushed back into the
desert by French, Malian and Chadian troops.
But they will
just melt back into the arid, remote and thinly populated Sahel/Sahara with a
wealth of porous borders to cross and re-cross to avoid counter-insurgency
operations and establish new bases. Mali
has a 1,376 km border with Algeria, 1,000km with Burkina Faso, 2,237km with
Mauritania and 821km with Niger. Even
with French support, US drones and the cooperation of neighbouring states they
cannot police this whole area.
The openness of borders and the security issues they
raise are huge. No solution to the Tuareg issue and the future of Islamist
movements (whether linked to al-Qaeda or not) will be possible without
cross-border cooperation and security, but that is almost impossible to achieve
even if all states were willing to cooperate.
And this then creates all sorts of tangled links between different
conflicts. Islamist fighters from Mali
have already been reported as reaching as far as northern Darfur in their
search for a new haven.
Northern Darfur borders the Central African
Republic, where a peace deal has temporarily ended fighting, but where elements
of the rebel movement funded their military campaign through access to gold
mines near the border with Darfur.
Resources like this and the possibility of shifting alliances with local
groups are another lure for stateless military groups able to traverse borders
with ease.
This lack of border controls, security and policing
not only lead to major problems for governments (insurgency, smuggling etc) but
also for local peoples. The Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony has been pushed out of Uganda and moves
between Central African Republic, DR Congo, South Sudan and Uganda killing,
looting and abducting people to serve as soldiers, porters or sex slaves. It survives through these depredations and
has now, as have the Janjaweed in Sudan’s Darfur province, moved into the
lucrative ivory poaching business.
The LRA and Janjaweed are said to have killed
elephants in DRC, CAR and Cameroon and transported the ivory to Sudan for
smuggling abroad – so environmental damage can be added to the list of problems
caused by weak African borders.
There is clearly no easy, fast or obvious solution
to the border issue. States may have
strongmen in charge but they have weak institutions and limited power over
remote areas. They cannot police huge borders which are often the focus of
conflict, irredentism, separatism and smuggling – especially when they often
lack legitimacy in these areas through political and economic policies which
marginalize them.
What is necessary is a continent-wide approach to
borders, for the African Union to go beyond treating the symptoms of conflict
through intervention forces, peacekeeping or attempts at peacemaking and look
seriously as the body representing the continent at the long-term future of
borders and people constrained, split or made almost stateless by them. A massive, holistic approach is necessary but
sadly the will is lacking, as proved by the way that the African Renaissance
and NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa’s Development) came to nought after the
initial fanfare.
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