The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) obliges states parties to
cooperate with the Court in regards to its investigations and prosecutions. It
is perhaps not too surprising then that Sudan, which never ratified the Rome
Statute, has not cooperated with the Court’s investigation in Darfur. What is
novel is that Kenya—which joined the ICC in 2005—is now practicing its own form
of non-cooperation that in many ways mirrors that of Sudan.
International community appeals for
ICC assistance
In both
Sudan and Kenya, ICC intervention was prompted by the findings of independent
international bodies. This is key to understanding these states’ interactions
with the Court.
In March
2005, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred the situation in
Darfur, Sudan for investigation by the ICC prosecutor.
This came after a UN
Commission of Inquiry in Darfur revealed that crimes against humanity and war
crimes had been committed and that the Sudanese legal system was incapable of
dealing with human rights violations.
Later that year, the prosecutor opened a full investigation.
In the
summer of 2008, the prosecutor requested the issuance of arrest warrants for
President Omar Ahmad Al-Bashir and other suspects. For many African and Arab
diplomats the decision to open investigations in Darfur wasn’t a big deal. They
were stunned, however, that a serving head of state could be prosecuted by the
Court following a referral from the Security Council.
Two years
after the Darfur referral, Kofi Annan handed over the Waki Commission envelope
– containing the names of those suspected of being primarily responsible for
Kenya’s 2007-08 post-election violence – to the ICC prosecutor. In November
2009, the prosecutor requested permission from ICC judges to uses his powers to
open an investigation into the violence, leading to charges against six
prominent Kenyans, including the future president and vice president.
Measures to escape ICC prosecutions
The Kenyan
suspects and their allies in government have used the government apparatus to
establish alternative rule of law mechanisms. In April 2012, President Mwai
Kibaki lobbied his peers to pass a resolution extending the jurisdiction of the
East Africa court of justice (EACJ) to cover crimes against humanity. Kibaki’s
intention was to ensure that Uhuru Kenyatta, Francis Muthaura, William Ruto and
Joshua Sang did not go to the ICC. Although the heads of state of the East
African community agreed to extend the jurisdiction of the EACJ in April 2012,
the vice president of the East African Law Society, James Mwamu, complained
that “The EACJ has no jurisdiction whatsoever to deal with criminal matters and
the move by the legislative assembly to pass that motion is absolutely
illegitimate”.
The Kenya
National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC) Commissioner Lawrence Muite also
challenged the government’s efforts to transfer the ICC cases to the EACJ. “This is not about justice for Kenyans. It is
all about politics and protecting a few individuals. They seek to add protocols
to the EACJ just for the sake of four people”.
It is worth
noting that as early as 2006 and 2007, civil society organisations in East
Africa had been advocating for extension of jurisdiction of the EACJ to include
human rights violations. However, this idea was hijacked by Kibaki to protect
the four suspects indicted by the ICC.
Similarly,
the Sudanese government established the Special Criminal Court for Events in
Darfur (SCCED) on June 7, 2005 – a day after the prosecutor of the ICC
announced that he was going to commence investigations in Darfur. However, the
cases at the SCCED do not address major issues of accountability in Darfur.
The ICC
prosecutor gave both Kenya and Sudan ample time to undertake genuine and
effective prosecutions at the national level before moving forward with his
prosecutions.
Both
countries have also tried to have their ICC cases deferred by the Security
Council (under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which allows for a one-year
deferral) and have sought African Union backing for their endeavours. However,
neither has found a receptive audience among Security Council members.
Politicization of the ICC process
By appealing
to tribal and ethnic sentiments – portraying the ICC as a tool of Western
imperialism—politicians in Sudan and Kenya have brainwashed many citizens and
discredited the ICC and the Security Council in their countries, their region
and beyond.
Extensive
propaganda has been used to spread lies and turn their citizens against the
Court and the Security Council while improving the credibility of suspects
wanted by the ICC.
In the run
up to the March 2013 elections, ICC suspect and Kenyan President-elect Uhuru
Kenyatta stated that Kenyans would be voting on a “referendum against the ICC.”
In relation to the prosecutor’s decision to drop charges against co-accused
Francis Muthaura, he said “if Muthaura’s case is collapsing, is that not an
indication even mine will go nowhere?” Kenyatta’s lie was exposed by ICC
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on March 20, 2013, when she stated very clearly that
he will face trial because the charges against him have not been dropped.
Over the
same period, the Kenyan Daily Post published a fake statement purporting to be
from the former ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo apologizing to Kenyans for
indicting four suspects of the 2007/8 post election violence. The statement entitled
“Romour: is it true?? Uhuru/Ruto ‘s ICC cases…Exclusive apology of Moreno
Ocampo to Kenyans” was completely false. While giving a speech with the
headline “Ten Years of the International Criminal Court: Is the World Better
Equipped to Deal with Mass Atrocities?” at the Roosevelt House Public Policy
Institute, Hunter College in New York City on the 19th of March 2013, Luis
Moreno Ocampo denied ever writing an apologetic letter to Kenyans.
In his
condemnation of the Al-Bashir arrest warrant, former Sudanese UN Ambassador
Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem Mohamad claimed that the ICC is tool of imperialism,
claiming that certain permanent members of the Security Council – the UK,
France and the United States – were using it to dominate and destabilize Sudan
and gain access to its oil and land. He
went on to say that the Court reflects the brand of Euro-American justice that
had destroyed Iraq, Afghanistan and Gaza.
Kenyans engaging legally
In May 2011,
the Kenyan government pursued an admissibility challenge claiming that, as a
result of the adoption of a new constitution and judicial reforms, it was now
capable of investigating and prosecuting ICC suspects. However, pre-trial
judges rejected the challenge, stating that there was no evidence of a national
investigation into the 2007-08 post-election violence. While explaining the decision to drop
charges in the Muthaura case on March 11, 2013, Bensouda complained of a lack
of cooperation:
“Despite assurances of cooperation, the government of Kenya has
provided only limited assistance to the prosecution and failed to provide the
prosecution with access to witnesses or documents which may shed light on the
Muthaura case.”
Kenyan ICC
suspects have never argued that they are senior government officials and are
also entitled to immunity. In August 2011, President Kibaki axed William Ruto
from his cabinet as higher education minister and Kenyatta and Muthaura both
resigned from their positions as finance minister and head of public service
and cabinet secretary, respectively, after the ICC charges had been brought
against them.
Sudan, on
the other hand, attempted to challenge the jurisdiction of the court and
admissibility of the Darfur situation through a Court-appointed defense
counsel. Pre-trial judges rejected that request stating that the counsel didn’t
have the right to make such a challenge. Sudan also argues that Al-Bashir is
entitled to immunity based on Articles 98(1) and 27 of the Rome Statute. In fact, Article 27 stipulates the
irrelevance of official capacity, in particular concerning heads of state.
International community must stand
firm on need for ICC prosecutions
In
conclusion, Kenya isn’t living up to its obligations as an ICC member state in
engaging with the Court from a strictly legal perspective. It has far too
readily followed Sudan’s lead in attempting to shield suspects from justice
through a variety of means.
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