Despite heavy deployment of security personel in
Tana River many lives have been lost in clashes.
In Kenya, ahead of the 2013 elections, attention is
turning to sources of tension that could fuel the kind of poll-related violence
seen at the end of 2007 and in the first few weeks of 2008.
In recent weeks, unrest in Coast province,
centred on the separatist Mombassa Republican Council (MRC), has garnered most
attention – most lately the beating and arrest of MRC leader Omar Hamisi
Mwamnwadzi on October 15, along with some of his supporters.
Also, the donor
community and Kenya’s political elite are highly pre-occupied with the fate of
four Kenyans facing charges related to 2008 election violence at the
International Criminal Court (ICC), including two presidential hopefuls (Deputy
Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and former Higher Education Minister William
Ruto).
However, these spectacles have overshadowed what may
be an episode with even more significant implications: the death in late August
and early September of some 116 in clashes in the Tana Delta between ethnic
Orma and Pokomo militia.
Although part
of Coast Province, the rural and impoverished Tana Delta is not really a
central part of Coastal politics.
Nonetheless, the drivers of the violence a few weeks ago are related to factors
not unique to the Tana Delta. In fact,
the Tana Delta violence highlights precisely the type of political and social
fault lines that may be at risk of erupting in the run up to, and aftermath of,
the elections in a number of areas.
Long-standing competition and conflict over access
to pasture and water resources were important factors, but did not alone
provide the trigger for violence.
A
range of political and economic factors have fed into the local dynamics in
Tana Delta. These include longer-term trends related to alienation of local
people from land due to large-scale government and private sector purchases,
and shorter-term impacts related to the process of delineating electoral
constituency boundaries and county districts in line with Kenya’s new
constitution.
The ready availability of small arms has also seen such conflicts
intensify in recent decades. Lack of livelihood opportunities for the youth is
also a major factor.
As such, the recent clashes are emblematic of wider
trends. Although the Tana Delta (along
with the rest of Coast Province) has tended to be politically marginalised,
tensions in other areas – such as Mt Elgon and parts of the Rift Valley
including Eldoret, Nakaru and Naivasha, and counties in northern Kenya – could
also be exacerbated by the same political factors. Some of these areas were flash-points in the
post-poll violence of late 2007 and early 2008, with major national and
regional ramifications.
Tana
aftermath
The violence in Tana also led to the forced
migration of an estimated 12,000 people.
An assistant minister, Dhadho Godhana, was arrested and lost his cabinet
portfolio; local area MPs traded accusations with the powerful Defence
Minister, Yusuf Haji, over who was to blame.
Media reporting and advocacy by civil society and
human rights organisations finally prompted the government into action when the
issue was debated in parliament on September 12. The government began deployment of some 2,000
members of the paramilitary General Services Unit (GSU) the following day. It also set up a commission of inquiry into
the matter.
Despite the deployment of security personnel,
violence continued and lives (including nine GSU personnel) and livelihoods
were lost. Government forces have also
been accused of serious human rights violations of by local residents, who
claim excessive force is being used in a bid to disarm them.
Drivers of Tana’s violence
Understanding the drivers of violence in the Tana
Delta helps to illustrate its relevance to other parts of Kenya (see also
Parselelo Kantai, ‘Tana Delta Burning’, in The Africa Report, No 45, November
2012, pp 37-39).
The
question of land
Going back to the 1970s, government schemes and
private enterprises (including by foreign companies) have dispossessed the
inhabitants of Tana from land in their area. Large-scale government and foreign
farming schemes have taken up tens of thousands of hectares previously used for
pasture and subsistence farming, and providing a major contributing factor to
conflict between farmers and pastoralists over access.
For example, the Bura Irrigation Scheme was set up
in 1978, and allocated 25,000 hectares. In addition to this, the Tana River
Development Authority has planted sugar, rice and maize on another 80,000
hectares. The government has also planned to allocate land in the Tana to
foreign investors, for example to grow Jatropha for biofuel feedstock
(involving a Canadian firm, Bedford Biofuels).
In late 2008, talks between Kenya and Qatar about a 40,000 hectares land
lease in the Tana Delta triggered a public backlash and were subsequently
shelved.
Playing
bad politics
A key aspect of the conflict is about land
ownership, as opposed to use, with the Orma and Pokomo fighting over land
rights. Recent boundary changes effected by the Independent Electoral
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) resulted in some villages, sub-locations and
locations being shifted to different electoral constituencies. Media reports
quoted local residents who blamed politicians seeking office for the
intensified fighting between the Pokomo and the Orma.
Other reports also suggest that politicians eyeing
gubernatorial, senate and parliamentary seats have been mobilising their
supporters ahead of the coming voter registration. There is also talk of politicians forging
alliances for the senate and gubernatorial seats ahead of the general election,
raising fears in some communities of being disenfranchised. The constitution has re-instated the senate,
and created a new tier of elected government at the county level – fostering
intensified competition for the resources those offices represent. The delineation of electoral boundaries is
hotly contested: the process is still not finished, only a few months before
the polls.
These local dynamics are also feeding into political
tussles on the national stage:
Local MP Godhana has accused Haji of being behind
the violence, and suggested that he has encouraged the immigration of Somalis
and al-Shabaab sympathisers. Other local MPs have also accused the minister of
interfering with the Tana River boundaries so as to benefit the Somali
inhabited parts that lie outside the Delta.
There are also longer-standing rumours that the Orma
have links to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), an ethnic-based insurgency mainly
operating in southern Ethiopia, but also in and out of northern Kenya. The Orma and Oromo share common ancestry, and
rumours that the OLF has supported the Orma have fuelled fears of the
intensification of the conflict.
Regardless of the truth of these rumours, the fact
that they tap into wider fears about inter-communal competition and conflict is
a worrying sign this close to an election.
Wider
resonances
Inter-communal killings and forced displacement have
recently affected not only Tana but also northern districts of Isiolo, Garissa,
Mandera, Moyale and Wajir. The ease with which communities in these areas
acquire fire-arms, organise themselves and plan attacks should concern security
agents but also development planners.
Widespread economic frustration, chronic impunity
and intense competition between politicians for political-economic resources
remain pervasive hallmarks of the Kenyan political economy, even after the
promulgation of what is considered a progressive constitution in 2011.
These dynamics are also at play well beyond northern
Kenya. For example, Mount Elgon has long
history of violence associated with the drawing and redrawing of boundaries.
Eldoret and other towns in the Rift Valley – such as
Nakuru and Naivasha – have long been cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic, but with
more ethnically uniform surrounding rural areas.
In early 2008, this led to violence against
non-Kikuyus in Nakuru and Naivasha; and against Kikuyus in places like Turbo
and Burnt Forest in the area surrounding Eldoret.
There have been occasional incidents of violence
along what was the pre-2010 constitution boundary between Nyanza and Rift
Valley Province. This is an echo of
violence in the area during the 1990s when ethnic Luo residents in Nandi (on
the Rift Valley side of the border) were the very first targets of attacks from
late 1991 onwards (for more on such dynamics, see Daniel Branch, Kenya: Between
Hope and Despair, 1963-2011)
Way
forward
Understanding that the same drivers – namely
pre-electoral political competition, and manoeuvring to benefit from the
re-drawing of electoral constituency boundaries – are at play across the
country should concentrate the minds of Kenya’s leadership and partners. These factors could feed into the existing
tensions in flashpoint areas affected by electoral violence in 2008 and in
previous polls – a long-standing pattern going back at least to the
re-introduction of multiparty politics in the early 1990s.
In the near-term, attention to these factors should
be raised. A focus on the MRC and
Kenya’s intervention in Somalia risks overlooking a wider, and potentially more
disruptive, pattern.
In the medium to long term, Kenya’s partners could
help to support efforts to address the longer-term, underlying grievances
beneath the violence in areas such as the Tana Delta. The current commission of inquiry into the
most recent violence could provide the first step in a sustained and rigorous
effort. It will be essential that the
commission be given the space to operate freely, and that its findings are
taken seriously.
The violence in the Tana Delta will also prove a key
test for the judiciary, which is on the front lines in the battle against
impunity in Kenya’s politics.
As such,
the commission for inquiry could have important resonances with the handling of
the ICC cases. Beyond the question of
impunity and accountability, there is also the matter of restitution for lives,
livelihoods and properties lost.
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