As reported last week, the DRC’s Eastern city of
Goma fell on Tuesday November 20th.
The next day M23 took Sake, 25 km to the
west. Many people now expected this to be the first step in an advance south
with the rebels setting their sites on taking Bukavu. But that hasn’t happened
(yet). Instead, M23’s military movements turned to the north and the west,
consolidating positions in Rutshuru and Masisi.
The FARDC has reorganized itself in Minova, the
border town between North and South Kivu. At the moment of writing this
article, it seems more likely that if M23 is going to take another town then it
will most likely be Beni.
This week all eyes were on Kampala – the venue of
the regional summit of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region.
The summit on November 25th ended with an agreement which included the
withdrawal of M23 from Goma within 48 hours. This did not happen.
Rwandan
interests in Congo are 3 phases
My intention here is not to write another overview
of recent Congolese history, nor do I intend to reduce the current situation
with M23 simply to its Rwandan dimension. However, it is important to remember
the joint military operation Umoja Wetu, which took place in January 2009. In
this operation, the Rwandan and Congolese armies aimed at dismantling the FDLR,
also hoping to put a seal on the new agreement between Congo and Rwanda and on
the integration of the CNDP within the Congolese army (FARDC). As such, the
agreement was the beginning of a third phase in the way Rwanda defended its
interests in Congo.
Phase
one
At first, in the wars of 1996-1997 and 1998-2002,
Rwanda defended its economic (and other) interests through a direct and open presence
on Congolese territory. As part of a complex and fragile peace process, Rwanda
officially withdrew its troops in September 2002. Its main ally, the
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), joined the transitional
government and participated in the 2006 elections. Their soldiers were also
integrated in to the FARDC.
Phase
two
At the start of the transitional period (2003-2006)
a small part of the RCD’s military (under the command of Laurent Nkunda) did
not join the newly integrated army. This was part of a ‘plan B’ to prevent the
Congolese Tutsi community losing its political weight and military power in the
event that transition, integration or elections did not favour them. This was
the start of a second phase, where Rwanda did not have an open and visible
presence in Congo, but where it gave military support to the rebel movement to
protect its interests and to maintain its impact on Congolese politics.
2008 was a bad year for both Kagame and Kabila. In
addition to the difficulties created by the arrest warrants for nearly the
entire RPF leadership (except Kagame) by the judges, Bruguière (in France) and
Andreu (in Spain), Rwanda was engaged in a painful argument with the EU over
the publication of the observation report on the September 2008 legislative
elections.
In December of the same year the UN experts’ report was published,
with plenty of detail on Rwandan support for Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP.
Joseph Kabila, powerless, and with his phantom army
facing the CNDP backed by Rwanda, had requested military help. The African
Union, Southern African Development Community (SADC), European Union and
individual countries such as Angola had, among others, considered sending
troops, but ultimately nobody came to his aid.
Umoja Wetu was a marriage based neither on love nor
common interests, but rather on the lack of other options for both partners.
Kabila had become isolated in the face of a humiliating political and military
situation, whilst Kagame had few other options as he was confronted with a
change in attitude on the part of some of his most loyal international partners
who had formerly supported him, almost unconditionally.
Phase
3
With this loveless marriage, the Rwandan policy to
defend its interests in Congo entered a third phase, a phase of partnership.
The rapprochement between Congo and Rwanda created an opportunity to strengthen
regional frameworks and initiatives in the belief that the complementary nature
of the countries of the region could be enhanced and shared interests could be
developed and contributed to a common identity.
Rwanda would still be able take advantage of the
unequal balance in the regional structures between itself as a strong state and
Congo, which remained very fragile.
The exploitation of Congo’s mineral
resources also remained crucial for Rwanda’s national budget as well as for the
personal wealth of its political and military élite. But, aware of the weakness
of the Congolese administration, the feeble steps taken against corruption and
the porous nature of the frontiers, Rwanda continued to try to maximize its
profits from the exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.
An
arranged but stable marriage
But somehow it worked. The east became a bit more
stable, even if insecurity did not entirely disappear. With the elections in
view, Kagame became Kabila’s most reliable ally. Kabila knew that his army
would never be able to maintain the necessary stability in the east of Congo.
Kagame seemed to be the only person who could keep the violence in Kivu at a
manageable level.
Kagame also needed this good relationship with
Kabila to continue in order to prevent military action against his regime
taking shape on Congolese soil. That became particularly relevant in March
2010, when General Kayumba Nyamwasa fled via Uganda to South Africa. Kayumba
Nyamwasa belonged to the inner circle of Kagame’s regime, a ‘companion de
route’ going back many years, and a key player on some of the most important
dossiers, including the plundering of Congo.
Very soon after his defection, it became clear that Kayumba, probably
with the support of Museveni, made contact with a number of armed groups in
Congo to investigate if a broad anti-Kagame coalition could be set up. However,
no operational military framework to fight Kagame ever materialized.
The improved relationship between Kagame and Kabila
turned out to be advantageous for both men. In December 2010 the CNDP joined
the Alliance de la Majorité Présidentielle, Kabila’s political coalition for
the elections. In some parts of North Kivu CNDP locked up the political space
to keep opposition candidates from campaigning.
But for Kabila there was a price to pay. A lot of
the military people in Kivu had difficulty in understanding why and how the
CNDP, who for many years were their worst enemies, became their superiors in
rank and had gained control over more soldiers, a much bigger area and more
mineral resources than ever before.
The civilian population had to face a CNDP which
behaved very arrogantly and felt they were above the law. When Vital Kamerhe,
former president of Parliament, left Kabila’s party in December 2010 and
founded a new opposition party, it was immediately clear that a considerable
part of the Kivutian electorate would follow him.
Kabila’s
dead end street
Kabila’s unfortunate current position has a lot of
similarities with the situation in 2008. His government wasn’t able to convince
people in the east of Congo of its capacity or even ambition to tackle the root
causes of the conflicts in the region.
His army has no chance against M23 with
open support from Rwanda.
Rwandan support to M23 has made it clear that Kabila
has lost his most reliable ally since 2009. An important part of the public
opinion is certain to disagree with any negotiations and nobody will believe
that they could lead to a credible solution and sustainable peace.
But refusing
to negotiate will further marginalise him on the regional and international
political scene, and will increase the military pressure.
This situation, especially after the fall of Goma,
has had a negative impact on the development of the institutions the country
has been trying, since 2006, to put back together. It has also humiliated
Kabila the man, as well as the office he holds.
Some people I have talked to
believe that the main strategy of M23 is to maintain the pressure on Kabila by
keeping control on one or more major towns in the east. Despite the deadline to
leave Goma, M23 remains in town. Each day this continues Kabila loses a bit of
his dignity and credibility as a leader, and people might soon start asking the
question, “what’s next?”
So far, the opposition has not given much evidence
of possessing a potential alternative leadership. They couldn’t convince
before, during and after the presidential and parliamentary elections. It seems
unlikely that they would provide the necessary backbone to the nation and the
state in the case that the regime collapses.
The army is even more problematic. It is often
presented as a heterogeneous, undisciplined, badly trained amalgam of different
militia.
To a great extent this is true, but it also masks a more complex
reality.
Broadly, there are three generations within the
military leadership:
The elder officers with a Mobutian background, which
means that they had proper training and a proper military career. Although they
were a part of a kleptocratic regime, they do have a military deontology.
The youngest generation contains the people who
followed programmes and training as part of the security sector reform
accompanied by several western and African countries. As a group, this
generation has potential.
In between those generations, there is a huge group
of people who made their career somewhere in the military landscape of a decade
and a half of fighting between irregular armed groups, without proper training
or ethics.
The scheme is further complicated by regional
alliances and interest groups within the army. Parts of the existing armed
forces never truly integrated, but kept the loyalties (and sometimes the
informal chains of command) they had during or just after the war.
I don’t exclude the possibility that individuals or
groups within the army might, at some stage, be attracted by a putsch scenario.
But the chances that such an initiative would restore public order and
efficiency, end corruption, protect civilians and put the democratic and peace
processes back on track is far below zero. It would simply cause an implosion
of the country.
Throwing back the peace process several years
Joseph Kabila started 2012 very bleakly by winning a
second mandate as president of the third Republic, after controversial
elections. He appointed a government with a rather technocrat image, led by
Prime Minister Matata Ponyo, who was responsible for some of the macro-economic
successes of the previous government, where he served as the Minister of
Finance.
This was a good move, and was well accepted by an
important part of Congolese and international public opinion. It created a bit
of space to solve the problems within and between the majority and the
opposition, and it gave people the feeling that the state was been taken care
of.
But things have turned out differently. The
rebellion of M23, the way Rwanda has supported it and the fact that Goma has
been taken, throws the peace process back several years.
The elections of 2006
and 2011 initiated a slow and gradual evolution where Congolese politics became
an area for politicians rather than for soldiers, rebels and warlords. Diplomacy
had replaced arms as the main tool to settle problems between countries. All
this has been reversed by the recent events in North Kivu. And every day it
takes, it affects the credibility of the president and the country’s
institutions.
I very much hope that M23 will keep its promise to
leave Goma before the end of the week.
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